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絕對(duì)的空無(wú)。東晉時(shí)各家多用“本無(wú)”表達(dá)般若空義，指出事物根本上是不存在的。這種觀點(diǎn)在僧肇等人看來(lái)有將“無(wú)”坐實(shí)、落入虛無(wú)主義的危險(xiǎn)，故僧肇著文批評(píng)，重申緣起性空的中道觀。但在后世作品中，同樣運(yùn)用“本無(wú)”，有時(shí)指緣起性空義，而非絕對(duì)的虛無(wú)，需加以鑒別。
Benwu, or original non-being, is a term used to refer to void. Philosophical schools in the Eastern Jin Dynasty used it to bracket the doctrine of emptiness from the Praj?āpāramitā literature ("The Perfection of Wisdom"), arguing that things are fundamentally non-existent. In the view of Seng Zhao and the like, the pitfall of this standpoint, by emphasizing the absolute "emptiness," is an inclination towards nihilism (which is expressively rejected by Buddhist doctrines). Seng Zhao thus criticized it through his writings: here affirmed the middle way (away from the two extremes of nihilism and eternalism), thus interpreted the emptiness as the dependent origination. This term benwu can also be found in the works of later generations. In certain cases, however, it was reinvented to be the "emptiness as the dependent origination" rather than "absolute emptiness." So, one should be cautious about its various connotations in different historical context.
引例 Citation：
◎本無(wú)者，情尚于無(wú)，多觸言以賓無(wú)。故非有，有即無(wú)；非無(wú)，無(wú)亦無(wú)。尋夫立文之本旨者，直以非有非真有，非無(wú)非真無(wú)耳。何必非有無(wú)此有，非無(wú)無(wú)彼無(wú)？此直好無(wú)之談，豈謂順通事實(shí)，即物之情哉?。ㄉ亍墩卣摗げ徽婵照摗罚?/p>
主張本無(wú)的教義，專注于虛無(wú)，凡出言便說(shuō)是“無(wú)”。所以他們講“有（存在）”是不真實(shí)的，“有”就是無(wú)；“無(wú)（不存在）”也是不真實(shí)的，“無(wú)”也是無(wú)。但若去探求他們的（經(jīng)典）依據(jù)，不過(guò)是說(shuō)“非有”并非真實(shí)的存在，“非無(wú)”也并非真的不存在。（倘若如此，）又何必堅(jiān)稱“非有”就是指存在者根本沒(méi)有，“非無(wú)”就是指不存在者也根本沒(méi)有呢？這僅僅是好談“無(wú)”的人的言論，怎能稱之為通達(dá)事實(shí)、觸及事物的真性呢？
The teaching of "original non-being" is obsessed with nothingness, which thoroughly dominates their discussion. They reject "being," because it is nonexistent. They also reject "non-being," because again non-being is neither existent. But if we look into the scriptures they alluded to, we will see that these texts actually reject the real "being" by naming "non-being" while reject real "non-being" as a refutation of substantialized non-being. Then why on earth should they insist that the negation of "being" is absolutely non-existent and the negation of "non-being" as if the non-being is actually nonexistent? They are just too much into their "nothingness"! How could they enter the reality without hindrance, and approach the true character of things? (Seng Zhao: Treatise of Seng Zhao)
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供稿：北京外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué) 外語(yǔ)教學(xué)與研究出版社
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